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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
UNITED STATES v. RESTREPO: 
UNCHARGED CONDUCT NOW 
CONSIDERED IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
UNDER FEDERAL SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES 
My object all sublime 
I shall achieve in time 
To let the punishment fit the crime 
The punishment fit the crime 
W.S. Gilbert, THE MIKADO; Act ii (1885) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Restrepo,t the Ninth Circuit, on a peti-
tion for rehearing, held that conduct of which the defendant was 
neither charged nor convicted could be taken into consideration 
at the defendant's sentencing hearing. 2 The court reasoned that 
this interpretation is consistent with the clear intent of the 
United States Sentencing Commission and the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines.3 
The Ninth Circuit also held that when considering un-
charged conduct at defendant's post-conviction sentencing hear-
ing, a preponderance of the evidence standard is sufficient for 
due process concerns.· When used to enhance a sentence, how-
1. United States v. Restrepo, 903 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1990) (per Boochever, J.; Noo-
nan, J., concurring; and Pregerson, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Restrepo II]. 
2. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 656. 
3. Id. at 653. See generally United States Sentencing Comm'n, Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1, 1989) [hereinafter Guidelines]. 
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ever, a more demanding interpretation of the standard is 
necessary. II 
Finally, the court held that applying the Guidelines as 
amended June 15, 1988, and mandated by statute,6 did not vio-
late the ex post facto clause,7 although defendant's conduct oc-
curred prior to the amendment.8 
II. FACTS 
A. F ACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On March 8, 1988, Dario Restrepo was indicted on two 
counts of cocaine distribution9 (counts I and 11).10 His co-de-
fendant, Judith DeMaldonado, was also charged with distribu-
tion under count 11.11 In addition, DeMaldonado was indicted on 
two counts of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute l2 
(counts III and IV).13 De Maldonado pleaded guilty to counts II, 
III and IV and agreed to testify against Restrepo in return for a 
lesser sentence.14 At trial in the district court, she testified that 
Restrepo had provided her with all the cocaine she had sold, and 
an additional amount that she had turned over to the police. III 
Restrepo was convicted of counts I and 11.16 
At his sentencing hearing, Restrepo objected to the Guide-
5. [d. at 654. 
6. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (1988) (sentencing court is to apply the version of the 
Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing). 
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. states "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law 
shall be passed." 
8. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 656. 
9. [d. at 650. The indictment was pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l) (1988) which 
provides in pertinent part: "[lIt shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intention-
ally-
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, 
distribute or dispense, a controlled substance." 
10. United States u. Restrepo, 903 F.2d 648, 650. Counts I and II involved a total of 
37.5 grams of cocaine. [d. at n.2. 
11. [d. 
12. [d. See also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), reproduced in part supra, note 9. 
13. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 650. Counts III and IV involved a total of 32.89 grams. 
[d. at n.2. 
14. [d. at 650. 
15. [d. When the police searched De Maldonado's house, she turned in an additional 
32.94 grams of cocaine. [d. n.2. 
16. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 650. 
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lines on separation of powers and due process grounds. 17 
Restrepo also objected to the court's application of the Multiple 
Counts section18 and the Relevant Conduct section,19 but these 
objections were overruled.20 
The district court judge applied the Guidelines by following 
several steps. First, it was determined that the drug offense sec-
tion entitled "Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting or 
Trafficking"21 was most applicable to Restrepo's offense.22 Under 
17. [d. Restrepo's argument that the Guidelines violate the federal constitutional 
doctrine of separation of powers was rejected by the Supreme Court in a different case 
after Restrepo's appeal was filed (See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) in 
which the Court held that the Sentencing Commission was not a violation of either the 
separation of powers doctrine or the non delegation doctrine). See also infra, notes 87-
102 and accompanying text. In addition, Restrepo's general argument that the Guide-
lines violated due process also failed. Restrepo II 903 F.2d at 650-51 n.3. See also United 
States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538, 544 (9th Cir. 1990) (Guidelines facially violate neither 
substantive nor procedural due process). See also infra, notes 103-16 and accompanying 
text. 
18. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 650. See also Guidelines § 3Dl.1, the Multiple Counts 
section, which provides in pertinent part: "When a defendant has been convicted of more 
that one count, the court shall: (a) Group the counts resulting in conviction into Groups 
of Closely-Related Counts ("Groups") .... (b) Determine the offense level applicable to 
each Group .... (c) Determine the combined offense level applicable to all groups taken 
together .... " 
19. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 650. See also Guidelines § IB1.3, the Relevant Conduct 
section, which provides in pertinent part: 
. (a) Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjust-
ments). Unless otherwise specified, (i) the base offense level 
where the guideline specifies more than one base offense level, 
(ii) specific offense characteristics and (iii) cross references in 
Chapter Two, and (iv) adjustments in Chapter Three, shall be 
determined on the basis of the following: 
(1) all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by 
the defendant, or for which the defendant would be otherwise 
accountable, that occurred during the commission of the of-
fense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the 
course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for 
that offense, or that otherwise were in furtherance of that 
offense. 
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which § 
3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts, all such 
acts and omissions that were part of the same course of con-
duct or common scheme or plan as the offense of 
conviction. . . . . 
20. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 650. 
21. Guidelines § 2D1.1. This section also includes possession with intent to commit 
these offenses. 
22. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 651. The Ninth Circuit discussed the district court's 
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that section, the base offense level is determined by reference to 
the Drug Quantity Table.23 The district judge then used the Rel-
evant Conduct section to set the total quantity of drugs in-
volved.24 Because all of the drugs involved were part of a com-
mon scheme,211 both the amount of cocaine included in the 
counts of which Restrepo was not convicted26 and the additional 
amount turned in by DeMaldonado27 were added to the amount 
involved in the counts of conviction.28 The judge adjusted for 
the multiple counts, grouping the two counts of conviction to-
gether pursuant to the Multiple Counts section29 and assigned 
an offense level corresponding to the total amount of drugs in-
volved.30 The court adopted a guideline range of forty-one to 
fifty-one months and sentenced Restrepo to forty-six months in 
prison.31 Had the court not aggregated the quantities of all the 
drugs involved, Restrepo's sentence range would have been 
23. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 651; see also Guidelines § 2D1.1(a)(3) which apply base 
offense level specified in Drug Quantity Table. 
24. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 651. See also Guidelines § lB1.3, reproduced in part 
supra note 20. 
25. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 651. The district court found the Government had 
proved Restrepo's and De Maldonado's participation in the common scheme by at least a 
preponderance of the evidence. "I'm satisfied certainly by a preponderance of the evi-
dence and in fact, I think, by clear and convincing evidence that Dario Restrepo supplied 
the cocaine that Judith Maldonado (sic) had at her house and that she sold on March I, 
the other cocaine that he wasn't convicted of." [d. at 655 (quoting Transcript of Sentenc-
ing Proceedings at 65). 
26. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 651. Restrepo was not convicted of counts III and IV, 
which involved a total of 32.89 grams. [d. at 650, n.2. 
27. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 651. The additional amount totalled 32.94 grams. [d. at 
650, n.2. 
28. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d ·at 651. Restrepo was convicted of counts I and II, which 
involved a total of 37.5 grams. [d. at 650, n.2. 
29. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 651. See also Guidelines § 3D1.2(d), which provides 
that counts are to be grouped together if the offense level is determined largely on the 
basis of the quantity of a substance involved. 
30. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 651. See also Guidelines § 3D1.3(b), which provides 
that in cases of counts grouped together pursuant to § 3D1.2(d), the applicable offense 
level corresponds to the aggregated quantity of the substance involved. 
31. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 650. The district court made additional findings at the 
sentencing hearing which served to increase Restrepo's sentence. First, the enhancement 
provision of § 2D1.3(a)(2)(B) was applied because Restrepo's sale of cocaine in count I 
occurred within 1000 feet of a school (Le. the University of Alaska). [d. at n.2. Second, 
Restrepo had obstructed justice before and during his trial. [d. As a result, the court 
increased his base offense level two points. [d. In addition, the district court found that 
Restrepo played the role of leader in the drug dealing ring of which De Maldonado was a 
part, and as a result, pursuant to § 3B1.l(c), his offense was increased an additional two 
points. [d. 
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twenty-seven to thirty-three months.32 
On appeal, Restrepo challenged the court's aggregation of 
the drugs involved in counts III and IV with the additional 
amount turned in by DeMaldonado in determining his base of-
fense level. 33 Restrepo also argued that the preponderance of the 
evidence standard used at the sentencing hearing violated due 
process.3• Restrepo also asserted an ex post facto violation be-
cause the district court applied the version of the Guidelines in 
effect at the time of sentencing rather than those effective at the 
time of his conduct. 311 
B. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
The Ninth Circuit had previously considered this appeal in 
1989,36 but decided the case differently. While the same issues 
were raised, the court limited its analysis to statutory interpre-
tation of the Guidelines. 37 
32. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 650. The aggregated quantity of cocaine (103.33 grams) 
carried a base offense level of 18 points (at least 100 grams but less than 200) with an 
applicable sentence range of 27 to 33 months. [d. at 651, n.4. See Guidelines §§ 2D1.1(c) 
(Drug Quantity Table), 5.2 (Sentencing Table). The four point increase raised the of-
fense level to 22 with a sentence range of 41 to 51 months. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 651, 
nn.2 & 4. 
The amount involved in conviction counts I and II (37.5 grams) carried a base of-
fense level of 14 (at least 25 grams but less than 50). See Guidelines §§ 2Dl.l(c) and 5.2. 
With the four point increase to a level of 18, the sentence range would have been 27 to 
33 months had the court not aggregated the quantities of drugs. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 
650-51, nn.2 & 4. See also Guidelines §§ 2Dl.l(c) and 5.2. 
33. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 650. 
34. [d., See U.S. CONST. amend. V and XIV (Due Process Clause applicable to 
states). 
35. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 650-51. Restrepo made this assertion in briefs filed after 
oral arguments. [d. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. reproduced supra note 7. 
36. See United States v. Restrepo, 883 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989) (per Pergerson, J.; 
Noonan, J., and Boochever, J., dissenting), rev'd on reh'g, 903 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1990) 
[hereinafter Restrepo I]. 
37. Restrepo [,883 F.2d at 784, n.7. The court stated that Restrepo's claim that the 
Guidelines violated due process by requiring a lesser standard of proof than that re-
quired for conviction (i.e. beyond a reasonable doubt) was foreclosed by the Supreme 
Court's recent decision in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). In McMillan, 
the Court ruled, in a challenge to Pennsylvania's Mandatory Sentencing Act, that the 
preponderance standard satisfied due process). McMillan, 477 U.S. at 80. The Ninth 
Circuit also determined that Restrepo's claim that the Guidelines violated the doctrine 
of separation of powers must fail (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989». See also supra 
note 17 and infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit also noted that 
by deciding the case on statutory grounds, the merits of Restrepo's ex post facto claim 
5
Goodin: Criminal Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
124 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:119 
Restrepo argued that no provision of the Multiple Counts 
section allowed a grouping together of all counts because he was 
never convicted of the two counts of DeMaldonado's 
conviction.38 
The Government argued that while convictions may be re-
quired under the Multiple Counts Section, they are not required 
under the Relevant Conduct section.89 
Judge Pregerson, writing for the majority in Restrepo 1,·0 
found the Guidelines ambiguous because both Restrepo's inter-
pretation and the Government's were supportable.41 He decided 
that because of this ambiguity, the "rule of lenity"411 should be 
applied.43 The court held that the district court erred in inter-
preting the Multiple Counts Section,·· and held that quantities 
of drugs involved in charges of which Restrepo was neither 
charged nor convicted could not be taken into consideration in 
determining his base offense level. 411 
Judge Boochever, dissenting in Restrepo 1,·8 wrote that the 
Guidelines were not ambiguous when read with the accompany-
ing commentary, and therefore the "rule of lenity" should not be 
need not be considered. Restrepo I, 883 F.2d at 784, n.7 (citing California v. Yamasaki, 
442 U.S. 682 (1979) (between a statutory claim and a constitutional claim, the court 
should pass on statutory claim first». Id. at 692-93. 
38. Restrepo I, 883 F.2d at 785. See also Guidelines Commentary at page 3.9 which 
states, "This part provides rules for determining a single offense level that encompasses 
all the counts of which the defendant is convicted." Id. (emphasis added). 
39. Restrepo I, 883 F.2d at 785. See Guidelines, § IB1.3, reproduced in part, supra 
note 20. In addition to that section, the Government pointed to the Application Notes 
which provide: "This subsection applies to offenses of types for which convictions on 
multiple counts would be grouped together pursuant to § 3D1.2(d); multiple convictions 
are not required." Guidelines at page 1.19. (emphasis added). 
40. Restrepo I, 883 F.2d at 782. Judge Pregerson wrote the dissenting opinion in 
Restrepo II. 
41. Restrepo I, 883 F.2d at 786. 
42. Id. (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 at 812 (1971) ("ambiguity con-
cerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity"». See also 
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 at 387 (1980) (rule of lenity applies to substantive 
criminal statutes, as well as imposition of penalties). 
43. Restrepo I, 883 F.2d at 786. 
44. Id. See also supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
45. Restrepo I, 883 F.2d at 786. 
46. Restrepo I, 883 F.2d at 786. Judge Boochever wrote the majority opinion in 
Restrepo II. 
6
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applied.47 As a result, Judge Boochever argued that the intent of 
the Sentencing Commission was clear,48 that conduct of which 
the defendant is neither charged nor convicted may be used to 
adjust the offense level under Chapter Three of the 
Guidelines. 49 
III. BACKGROUND 
A. THE GUIDELINES 
For almost a century, the federal criminal justice system has 
utilized a system of indeterminate sentencing.Clo Under this sys-
tem, statutes specified maximum penalties for crimes, but judges 
were left with wide discretion in determining the appropriate 
sentence. lil As a result, serious disparities in sentencing were 
common.Cl2 As early as 1958, Congress sought to create more 
rigid criteria for sentencing in the federal courtS.Cl3 These efforts 
proved to be largely unsuccessful,Cl4 and fundamental dissatisfac-
tion with the uncertainties and disparities of the present system 
continued. 1I1I 
In response, Congress enacted the Sentence Reform Act in 
1984C16 and established the United States Sentencing Commis-
sion (the Commission).57 The Commission is an independant en-
tity within the judicial branch&8 comprised of seven voting mem-
bers appointed by the President with the advice and consent of 
47. Restrepo [, 883 F.2d at 786-87. Specifically, he cited the commentary to § 1B1.3, 
which provides: "[I]n a drug distribution case, quantities of drugs not specified in the 
count of conviction are to be included [in determining the offense level] if they were part 
of the same course of conduct as the count of conviction." Guidelines Commentary at 
page 1.20. 
48. Restrepo [, 883 F.2d at 787. 
49. [d. at 787-88. 
50. See United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989) for a discussion of pre-
Guidelines sentencing policies and practices. Also see infra notes 87-102 for a discussion 
of substantive issues of Mistretta. 
51. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363. 
52. [d. at 365. 
53. [d. In 1958, Congress authorized the creation of judicial sentencing institutes 
and joint councils to formulate standards and criteria for sentencing. [d. 
54. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365-66. 
55. [d. at 366. 
56. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. II, 98 Stat. 1987 
(1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 3551-3742 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1988». 
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Congress.1I9 At least three of the members are Federal judges,60 
and the Attorney General, or his designee, serves as an ex-officio 
non-voting member.61 
The Commission's purpose was to establish just sentencing 
policies and practices and establish detailed guidelines prescrib-
ing appropriate sentences for offenders convicted of federal 
crimes.62 The guidelines were to be designed to assure certainty 
and fairness, and reduce the problems associated with the previ-
ous system.6S The Guidelines were submitted to Congress, and 
became effective on November 1, 1987.64 Congress, in enacting 
the sentencing law, sought to achieve three objectives:811 hon-
esty;66 uniformity;67 and proportionality in sentencing.66 
Through honesty in sentencing, Congress sought to eliminate 
previous situations whereby an offender would be sentenced to 
twelve years, but released on parole after four.69 Congress 
achieved this objective by abolishing parole.70 The Commission 
59. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) also provides that the Chairman and members of the Com-
mission shall be subject to removal by the President only for "neglect of duty or malfea-
sance in office or for other good cause shown." 
60. Id. 
61. Id. In addition, § 991(a) provides that no more than four members of the Com-
mission may be of the same political party. 
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b) (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (1988). 
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988) (requirements of fairness and certainty as 
purposes of the Commission). Also, see § 994(0 (Commission directed to give "particular 
attention" to requirements providing for "certainty and fairness in sentencing and re-
ducing unwarranted sentencing disparities."). 
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988). Offenders who commit crimes on or after Nov. I, 1987 
will receive sentences under the Guidelines. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 189, 
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS at 3372. 
65. See Guidelines Commentary at 1.2, (1989). See also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess. 54, 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3237, 3239. 
66. See Guidelines Commentary at 1.2, (1989). See also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess. 54, 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3237, 3239. 
67. See Guidelines Commentary at 1.2, (1989). See also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess. 54, 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3237, 3239. 
68. See Guidelines Commentary at 1.2, (1989). See also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 
2d Sess. 54, 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 3237, 3239. 
69. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3239. 
70. Section 235(b)(1) of the Sentencing Reform Act provides that the law shall re-
main in effect for five years after the effective date of the Act as to defendants convicted 
before that date and as to sentences imposed before the new guidelines take effect. PUB. 
L. No. 98-473 § 235,98 STAT. 2032 (1984), as amended by PUB. L. No. 99-217, §§ 2 & 4, 99 
STAT. 1728, 1730, codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (Supp. 1990). Section 235(b)(3) of the 
Sentencing Reform Act requires the Parole Commission to set release dates for all of-
fenders sentenced under the old Act who will remain in prison after the effective date. 18 
8
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noted an inherent tension, however, between uniformity (treat-
ing similiar cases alike) and proportionality (treating different 
cases differently),71 The Commission agreed that only including 
a few simple categories of crimes would make the Guidelines 
uniform and easy to apply, but at. the same time would not rec-
ognize important differences between some offenses,72 The Com-
mission found this conflict impossible to resolve, and settled for 
a balance between a broad categorization and a highly detailed 
and complex one,73 
The Commission also had to resolve whether to base 
sentences on the actual conduct of the offender ("real offense" 
sentencing), or to base sentences solely on the elements of the 
offense with which the offender was charged ("charge offense" 
sentencing)," The Commission initially sought a "pure" real of-
U.S.C. § 3551 (Supp. 1990). 
Some confusion exists as to whether the "effective date" refers to the enactment 
date of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act (Oct. 12, 1984) or the Sentencing Reform 
Act (Nov. I, 1987), but courts have held that the five year period commenced Nov. I, 
1987. See e.g. Romano v. Luther, 816 F.2d 832 (2d. Cir. 1987) (1984 date would result in 
the strange consequence of having the transition period begin three years before the new 
sentencing system became effective). The Parole Commission must therefore set release 
dates for all offenders sentenced under the old Act who will remain in prison after Nov. 
I, 1992. Romano 816 F.2d at 839. 
71. See Guidelines Commentary at 1.2. The Commission observed that perfect uni-
formity - giving identical sentences to every offender - would destroy proportionality. 
Id. 
72. Id. The Commission observed that having only a few categories of crimes would 
"lump together offenses that are different in important respects." Id. 
At the same time, the Commission believed a system tailored to fit every conceivable 
situation would be unworkable and would "compromise the certainty of punish-
ment. " .. Id. The Commission gave the following example of the complexities 
involved: 
Id. 
A bank robber with (or without) a gun, which the robber kept 
hidden (or brandished) might have frightened (or merely 
warned), injured seriously (or less seriously), tied up (or sim-
ply pushed) a guard, teller or a customer, at night (or at 
noon), for a bad (or arguably less bad) motive, in an effort to 
obtain money for other crimes (or other purposes), in the com-
pany of a few (or many) other robbers, for the first (or fourth) 
time that day, while sober (or under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol), and so forth. 
73. Guidelines at 1.3. The Commission stated "In the end, there is no completely 
satisfying solution to this practical stalemate. The Commission has had to simply bal-
ance the comparative virtues and vices of broad, simple categorization and detailed com-
plex subcategorization .... Any ultimate system will, to a degree, enjoy the benefits and 
suffer from the drawbacks of each approach." Id. 
74. Id. at 1.5. See generally Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the 
9
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fense system,7C1 but found that system would require considera-
tion of the precise harms to take into account, and found such 
an approach to be "too complex to be workable."76 The present 
Guidelines represent a move toward a charge offense system, 
while retaining some aspects of the real offense system." The 
Guidelines first look to the offense charged to determine the 
"base offense level."78 The sentencing judge may modify that 
sentence if there are any aggravating or mitigating circum-
stances.79 Further adjustments for certain types of offenses8o are 
allowed by the Relevant Conduct section after consideration of 
conduct related to the charged offense.81 
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
1. Separation of Powers and Nondelegation 
In an earlier Ninth Circuit decision, Gubienso-Ortiz v. 
Kanahele,82 the Ninth Circuit held the Sentencing Reform Act 
to be a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.83 The 
Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1,8·12 (1988) for Judge 
Stephen Breyer's analysis of the differences between "real" and "charge" offense sys-
tems, various decision-making processes of the Commission and basic workings of the 
Guidelines [hereinafter Breyer). 
75. Guidelines Commentary at 1.5. 
76. Id. In addition to being too complex, the Commission observed that such a sys-
tem would also risk a return to wide disparity in practice. The Commission experimented 
with a "modified real offense system" which it published in a Sept. 1986 preliminary 
draft. The Commission found this approach also to be too complex and mechanistic and 
decided that it could not find a fair and efficient way to implement either the "pure" or 
the "modified" system, and ultimately abandoned that approach. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. See Guidelines §§ 1B1.3(a)&(b). See also Breyer, 'at 11-12. 
79. See Guidelines §§ 2B3.l(b) (1)-(5). Generally, aggravating and mitigating factors 
revolve around the offender's role in the crime, the status of the victim, the extent of the 
criminal enterprise, offender's criminal history, and the offender's acceptance of respon-
sibility. Id. For drug offenses, aggravating factors include selling to persons under 21, to 
pregnant women, within 1000 feet of a school or college, sales as part of a continuing 
criminal enterprise, use of communication facilities in committing drug offenses, mainte-
nance of or placing of dangerous devices to protect unlawful production, etc. Guidelines 
§ 2D1.2-1.10. 
80_ See Guidelines § 3D1.2(d). These types of offenses generally involve drugs or 
money, or offenses ongoing or continuous in nature. Id. 
81. Guidelines § 1B1.3, reproduced in relevant part, supra note 19. 
82. 857 F.2d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1988) vacated sub nom United States v. Chavez, 
109 S. Ct. 859 (1989) on remand Gubienso-Ortiz v. Kanahele 871 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 
1989) [hereinafter Gubienso). 
83. Gubienso, 857 F.2d at 1254. 
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court found that the Commission, by authorizing federal judges 
to promulgate substantive sentencing regulations,84 performed a 
function political rather than judicial. 86 This impermissibly 
granted the judiciary power and authority properly belonging to 
the Executive or Legislative Branches.86 
Subsequently, in Mistretta v. United States,87 the United 
States Supreme Court held the Sentence Reform Act and the 
Guidelines neither violative of the separation of powers doctrine 
nor the nondelegation doctrine,88 and thus overruled Gubienso-
Ortiz.89 The Court recognized that Congress, in certain circum-
stances, may confer rulemaking authority on the Judicial 
Branch.90 
Acknowledging a similiarity between the Sentence Reform 
Act and the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,91 the Court observed 
84. [d. at 1254-57. The court found the Guidelines have the force and effect of laws, 
that the Commission made important policy decisions finding support for its conclusion 
that the Guidelines are substantive rather than procedural in Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 
423 (1987) in which the court found the Guidelines were substantive in an ex post facto 
challenge to Florida's similiar sentencing guidelines. Gubienso, '857 F.2d at 1257. 
85. Gubienso, 857 F.2d at 1259. 
86. [d. at 1254. The court went on to note that it need not decide whether the Com-
mission's function is legislative or executive because: 
lIlt is easier to determine that a government function is non-
judicial than to state with certainty that the function is execu-
tive or legislative. Because any nonjudicial government func-
tion is likely to involve some executive and legislative aspects, 
judges should not exercise such functions even when it cannot 
be definitely stated that the functions are either executive or 
legislative. 
[d. at 1259, n.8 (quoting Comment, Separation of Powers and Judicial Service on Presi-
dential Commission, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 993, 1007-08 n.80 (1986)). 
87. 488 U.S. 361 (1988). 
88. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 379, 397. 
89. See United States v. Gonzales-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043 (9th Cir. 1990) which 
determined, "On January 18, 1989, the Supreme Court effectively overruled the decision 
in Gubineso-Ortiz by declaring the Guidelines constitutional." 
[d. at 1044. 
90. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 386-87 (citing Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 
(1941)). Sibbach upheld a challenge to certain rules under the Rules Enabling Act of 
1934 which gave the Judiciary power to promulgate federal rules of civil procedure. The 
Mistretta Court went on to note that pursuant to this power to delegate rulemaking 
authority to the Judiciary, Congress expressly has authorized the Supreme Court to es-
tablish rules for the conduct of its own business, to prescribe rules of procedure for lower 
federal courts in bankruptcy cases, in other civil cases, in criminal cases, and to revise 
the federal rules of evidence. Mistretta at 388. 
91. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 386-87. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988). 
11
Goodin: Criminal Procedure
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991
130 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:119 
that Congress undoubtedly has the power to regulate the prac-
tice and procedure of federal courts by delegating rulemaking 
authority to the Judicial Branch.92 The Court noted that sub-
stantive judgment regarding sentencing practices has always 
been a function appropriate to the Judiciary93 therefore, place-
ment in the Judicial Branch of an independent commission to 
regulate sentencing practices does not violate the principle of 
separation of powers.94 
In considering the nondelegation issue, the Court noted that 
if Congress provides an "intelligible principle" to which the 
body authorized to exercise the delegated authority must con-
form, there will be no forbidden delegation of power.911 The 
Court found that Congress had provided the Commission with 
substantial guidance by establishing certain goals and purposes 
of the Act.96 Moreover, Congress instructed the Commission to 
develop a system of sentence ranges using current average 
sentences as a starting point,97 and that these ranges must con-
92. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 387 (citing Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9-10). See also supra note 
90. 
93. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396. The Court also referred to the legislative history of 
the Act, saying that placement of the Commission in the Judicial Branch reflected a 
strong feeling by Congress that sentencing has and should remain primarily a judicial 
function. [d. at 390 (citing S. REP. No. 98-225 at 159). 
94. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 397. 
95. [d. at 372. "So long as Congress 'shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible 
principle to which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority) is 
directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative 
power.''' [d. (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 at 409 
(1928». 
96. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374. Congress charged the Commission with three goals: 
(1) to assure the purposes of sentencing as set forth in this Act; (2) to provide for cer-
tainty and fairness, and to avoid unwarranted disparity in sentencing while maintaining 
flexibility to permit individualized sentences and (3) to reflect the advancement in 
knowledge of human behavior as it pertains to the criminal justice system. [d. See also 
28 U.S.C. 991(b)(l) (1988). Congress also charged the Commission with four purposes: (1) 
to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law and to provide 
just punishment; (2) to afford adequate de terrance to criminal conduct; (3) to protect the 
public from further crimes of the defendant and (4) to provide the defendant with 
needed correctional treatment. Mistretta 488 U.S. at 374. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) 
(1988). 
97. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 375 (citing 28 U.S.c. § 994(m) (1988». Congress further 
mandated that the Guidelines include: 
(A) a determination whether to impose a sentence to pro-
bation, a fine, or a term of imprisonment; 
(B) a determination as to the appropriate amount of a 
fine or the appropriate length of a term of probation or a term 
of imprisonment; 
12
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form to existing statutory provisions.98 In addition, Congress 
specifically enumerated factors for the Commission to consider 
when formulating offense categories99 and categories of defend-
ants. 100 The Court concluded that the guidance provided by 
Congress was wholly adequate,I°l therefore Congress had not im-
permissibly delegated authority to the Commission. l02 
2. Due Process 
While the Supreme Court has not yet expressly addressed 
whether the Guidelines violate a defendant's right to due pro-
cess under the fifth amendment of the Constitution,103 the Ninth 
Circuit has directly addressed the issue in United States v. 
Brady. 104 
In Brady, the Ninth Ciruit held that the Guidelines do not 
(C) a determination whether a sentence to a term of im-
prisonment should include a requirement that the defendant 
be placed on a term of supervised release, and, if so, the ap-
propriate length of such term; and 
(D) a determination whether multiple sentences to terms 
of imprisonment should run concurrently or consecutively. 
28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (1988). 
98. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 375 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(b) (1988». Congress also re-
quired that for terms of imprisonment, "the maximum of range should not exceed the 
minimum of that range by more than the greater of 25 percent or 6 months, except that, 
if the minimum of the range is 30 years or more, the maximum may be life imprison-
ment." 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1988). 
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(c)(1)-(7) (1988). The factors to be considered are: the grade 
of the offense; the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the crime; the nature and 
the degree of harm caused by the crime; the community view of the gravity of the of-
fense; the public concern generated by the crime; the deterrent effect that a particular 
sentence may have on others; and the current incidence of the offense. [d. 
100. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 376-77. Congress listed 11 different considerations: the 
offender's age, education, vocational skills, mental and emotional condition, physical 
condition (including drug dependence), previous employment record, family ties and re-
sponsibilities, community ties, role in the offense, criminal history, and degree of depen-
dence upon crime for a livelihood. 28 U.S.C. §(d)(1)-(1l) (1988). 
101. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 379. 
102. [d. at 412. 
103. See United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1990). "The Supreme Court 
has upheld the constitutionality of the Guidelines over challenges based on alleged viola-
tions of separation of powers and improper delegation of legislative authority ... but has 
not yet addressed whether the Guidelines violate due process." [d. at 539. The fifth 
amendment reads in relevant part: "No person shall be ... deprived of life. liberty, or 
property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
104. 895 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Brady]. 
13
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facially violate due process. 1011 The court began by noting that 
the Supreme Court had recently upheld the constitutionality of 
the Guidelines over challenges based on violation of separation 
of powers and improper delegation of legislative powers.106 The 
court further noted that other circuits have unanimously con-
cluded that the Guidelines do not violate substantive or proce-
dural due process rights. l07 
The court observed that judicial weighing of sentencing fac-
tors does not "rest at the core of due process."108 Rather, "con-
sideration of those factors is the key to individualized sentenc-
ing, "109 which has never included the right to challenge the 
weight given to various sentencing factors. 110 In a previous Ninth 
Circuit case, United States v. Barkerlll the importance of indi-
vidualized sentencing was also stressed, but the court in Brady 
interpreted Barker as being less concerned with the appropriate-
ness of a given sentence, than the "propriety of the process 
through which the sentence was imposed."1l2 Specifically, 
Barker required that factors1l3 be considered to insure that the 
105. Brady, 538 F.2d at 540. 
106. [d. at 539 (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)). See also 
supra notes 87-102 and accompanying text. 
107. [d. at 539-40 (citing United States v. Thomas, 884 F.2d 540, 542- 44 (10th Cir. 
1989); United States v. Harris, 876 F.2d 1502, 1504-06 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 
417 (1989); United States v. Bolding, 876 F.2d 21, 23 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. 
Pinto, 875 F.2d 143, 145-46 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Allen, 873 F.2d 963, 966 (6th 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Seluk, 873 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir. 1989) (per curiam); (United 
States v. Brittman, 873 F.2d 827, 828 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 184 (1989); 
United States v. Vizcaino, 870 F.2d 52, 53-56 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. White 869 
F.2d 822, 825 (5th Cir.) (per curiam,) cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3172 (1989); (United States 
v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1009-10 (3d Cir) (decided only on substantive due process 
grounds), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2442 (1989)). 
108. Brady, 895 F.2d at 541 (citing United States v. Ortega-Lopez 684 F. Supp. 1506 
(C.D. Cal. 1988) (en bane)). In Ortega-Lopez, the district court found the Guidelines 
highly mechanistic, and determined the formulas and narrow ranges of sentences pre-
scribed by the Guidelines violated defendant's rights to due process under the fifth 
amendment by divesting the court of discretion to impose individualized sentences. The 
district court did note that the Guidelines allowed consideration of certain individual-
ized factors, but concluded that the Guidelines prevented judges from "weighing" the 
factors, and that this "weighing" rests at "the core of due process." Ortega-Lopez at 
1513. 
109. Brady, 895 F.2d at 541 (emphasis in original). 
110. [d. at 543. 
Ill. 771 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1985) [hereinafter Barker]. 
112. Brady, 895 F.2d at 541 (citing Barker, 771 F.2d at 1365-66). 
113. Barker suggested these factors may include considerations of the past life and 
habits of the defendant, the particular defendant's culpability and all the circumstances 
14
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defendant was "assessed and sentenced as an individual."1l4 The 
court in Brady stated that because the Guidelines require just 
such an assessment, they are in accord with the principles enun-
ciated in Barker. m Therefore, the court concluded that the 
Guidelines do not infringe upon a defendant's right to individu-
alized sentencing.1l6 
The court emphasized that although the Guidelines do not 
facially violate due process, a defendant is not foreclosed from 
bringing due process challenges to the Guidelines in individual 
cases.1I7 An applied due process claim would be appropriate if 
the defendant claimed that the Guidelines were being applied 
without opportunity to contest the factors relevant to sentenc-
ing. lIS In short, a defendant may challenge a court's considera-
tion of relevant factors, but may not challenge the weight given 
to them.1l9 
The Ninth Circuit has also addressed due process in view of 
the evidentiary standard to be applied at the sentencing hear-
ing.120 In United States v. Fernandez- Vidana, 121 a pre-Guide-
lines case, the Ninth Circuit held that using a preponderance of 
the evidence standard to sentence a defendant for distributing 
cocaine does not violate due process.122 In a post-Guidelines 
case, United States v. Howard,123 the Ninth Circuit relying on 
of the crime. See Barker, 771 F.2d at 1365. 
114. Brady, 895 F.2d at 541 (citing Barker, 771 F.2d at 1365-66) (emphasis in 
original». 
115. Brady, 895 F.2d at 541. See also United States v. Kidder, 869 F.2d 1328 (9th 
Cir. 1989). In Kidder the mandatory minimum sentencing provision was upheld in the 
face of a due process challenge, "[Nlothing in Barker suggests that sentencing judges 
must be free to impose whatever sentence they believe is appropriate .... {BJarker 
merely requires that, in choosing a sentence within the statutory limits, a trial judge 
must make an individual assessment of the defendant's culpability." [d. at 1334-35 (em-
phasis in original). 
116. Brady, 895 F.2d at 539. 
117. [d. at 543 (citing United States v. Brittman, 872 F.2d 827 at 828). 
118. [d. 
119. Brady, 895 F.2d at 543. 
120. See United States v. Fernadez-Vidana, 857 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1988); United 
States v. Howard, 894 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir.1990). See also infra notes 129-36 and accom-
panying text. 
121. 857 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1988). 
122. Fernandez- Vidana, 857 F.2d at 673. The issue of whether a lesser standard 
might be sufficient was not before the court, so the court held only that applying the 
preponderance standard 'was not in error. [d. at 675. 
123. 895 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1990). 
15
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Fernandez, again upheld the use of the preponderance stan-
dard. l24 The court noted that this holding was consistent with 
the recent Supreme Court opinion, McMillan v. Pennsylva-
nia,126 which held that a preponderance of the evidence standard 
satisfied due process in state court sentencing.126 Consequently, 
while a separation of powers challenge to the Guidelines has 
been foreclosed by the Supreme Court,127 and a facial due pro-
cess challenge has been foreclosed by the Ninth Circuit,128 de-
fendants in the Ninth Circuit can still bring an as applied due 
process challenge,129 and may also challenge the court's applica-
tion of the Guideline~ on statutory grounds. ISO 
C. THE VIEW OF OTHER CIRCUITS 
After explicitly discussing the relationship between the Rel-
evant Conduct section and the Multiple Counts section, the 
First, lSI SeventhlS2 and Eleventh Circuits, ISS have held that 
drugs not included in the offense of conviction, but part of the 
"same course of conduct or common scheme or plan"ls4 as the 
offense of conviction may be properly considered in determining 
124. Howard, 895 F.2d at 1090. 
125. 477 U.S. 79 (1986). 
126. McMillan 477 U.S. at 80. See also supra note 37. 
127. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 See also supra note 17, and 
supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text. 
128. See Brady, 895 F.2d at 539-43. See also supra notes 105-17 and accompanying 
text. 
129. See Brady. 895 F.2d at 543. See also supra notes 118-20 and accompanying 
text. 
130. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d) (providing that courts of appeal in reviewing imposed 
sentence shall determine whether it (1) was imposed in violation of law; (2) was imposed 
as a result of an incorrect application of the Guidelines; or (3) unreasonably departs 
from the prescribed Guideline range). 
131. See e.g. United States v. Blanco, 888 F.2d 907 Ost Cir. 1989) (defendant 
pleaded guilty to possession of 125 grams but was sentenced based on finding that he 
attempted to possess, or did possess, between 500 grams and 1.9 kilograms); United 
States v. Gerante, 891 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1989) ($68,000 cash found in defendant's home 
properly treated as equivalent to estimated quantity of cocaine). 
132. See e.g. United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1989) (entire 302 grams 
of cocaine base sent' to defendant through mail required to be considered even though 
defendant only received 1.88 grams); United States v. Vopravil, 891 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 
1989) (negotiations for sale of one kilogram of cocaine clearly related to offense of 
conviction). 
133. See e.g. United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1990) (total quantity 
of cocaine allegedly involved in conspiracy properly considered). 
134. Guidelines § IB1.3(a)(2). 
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the base offense level,l36 In United States v. Blanco,t36 the First 
Circuit stated that the reference to the Multiple Counts section 
in the Relevant Conduct section specifically relates to "fungible 
item" crimes, such as those involving drugs and money, and ob-
served that only these crimes allow consideration of conduct not 
included in the offense of conviction, but part of the same course 
of conduct as the convicted offense.137 
Without discussing the relationship between the Multiple 
Counts section and the Relevant Conduct Section, the Second,138 
Fifth/39 Sixthl40 and Eighth Circuitsl41 have allowed aggregation 
of quantities of drugs not included in the offense of 
conviction.142 
The First,H3 Second,144 Third,146 Fourth,146 Sixth,147 
Eighth,t48 Tenth149 and Eleventh Circuitsl60 have all held that 
135. See Blanco, 888 F.2d at 909-11; Gerante, 891 F.2d at 369 (drugs may also be 
aggregated when government alleges only one count); White 888 F.2d at 496-97; Voprauil 
891 F.2d at 157; Alston 895 F.2d at 1371-72. 
136. 888 F.2d 907 (1st Cir. 1989). 
137. Blanco, 888 F.2d at 911. Judge Breyer, writing for the court, noted that for 
crimes such as murder or bank robbery, the court will ·not use the Relevant Conduct 
section to look to acts that are part of the same course of conduct unless the government 
separately charges and obtains convictions for those acts. I d. at 911. See also infra note 
199. 
138. See e.g. United States v. Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1988) (698 grams of 
cocaine involved in two counts dismissed pursuant to plea agreement properly 
considered). 
139. See e.g. United States v. Taplette, 872 F.2d 101 (5th Cir.), (drugs involved in 
three counts dismissed pursuant to plea agreement properly considered), cert. denied, 
110 S. Ct. 128 (1989). 
140. See e.g. United States v. Smith, 887 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1989) (ten grams of 
cocaine involved in one count dismissed pursuant to plea agreement properly 
considered). 
141. See e.g. United States v. Mann, 877 F.2d 688 (8th Cir. 1989) In Mann, a de-
fendant turned informant was arrested with 82.09 grams of cocaine and informed DEA 
agents that he obtained the cocaine from Mann. Subsequently, Mann was arrested with 
60.04 grams. Mann's sentence was found to be properly based on total of 142.2 grams. 
Mann, 877 F.2d at 689. 
142. See Guerrero, 863 F.2d at 250; Taplette, 872 F.2d at 106; Sailes, 872 F.2d at 
738·39; Smith, 887 F.2d at 106-08; Mann, 877 F.2d at 690. 
143. E.g. United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437 (1st Cir. 1989). 
144. E.g. United States v. Guerra, 888 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1989). 
145. E.g. United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285 (3d Cir. 1989). 
146. E.g. United States v. Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d 1234 (4th CiT), cert. denied, 110 
S. Ct. 346 (1989). 
147. E.g. United States v. Silverman, 889 F.2d 1531 (6th Cir. 1989). 
148. E.g. United States v. Gooden, 892 F.2d 725 (8th Cir. 1989). 
17
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the preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies due process 
in sentencing defendants under the Guidelines. l6l 
The Second,1II2 Sixthll'3 and Tenth Circuitslll• have held that 
the 1988 amendments are merely a clarification of the original 
version of the Guidelines, and do not present an ex post facto 
violation. lllll The Eleventh Circuit has held that there is no sub-
stantive difference between the two versions. llle The Fifth Cir-
cuit, while not directly addressing the possibility of an ex post 
facto violation, observed that it was not absolutely plain that 
under the pre-1988 Guidelines relevant conduct could be 
considered.11l7 
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
1. Application of the Guidelines 
The Ninth Circuit majority stated that the Sentencing 
149. E.g. United States v. Frederick, 897 F.2d 490 (lOth Cir. 1990). 
150. E.g. United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1990). See also supra 
note 134. 
151. See Wright, 873 F.2d at 441-42 (preponderance standard satisfies due process); 
Guerra, 888 F.2d at 251 ("preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies the requisite 
due process in determining relevant conduct [under the) .. . Guidelines."); McDowell, 
888 F.2d at 290-91 ("[D)efendant's rights in sentencing are met by a preponderance of 
evidence standard."); Urrego-Linares, 879 F.2d at 1237 (due process satisfied by applica-
tion of preponderance standard); Silverman, 889 F.2d at 1535 ("The preponderance of 
the evidence standard applies to contested facts in sentencing proceedings."); Gooden, 
892 F.2d at 727-28 ("We ... are satisfied that the preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard used here by the District Court does not violate the Due Process Clause."); Freder-
ick, 897 F.2d at 492 ("[W)e hold that the correct standard is the preponderance of the 
evidence."); Alston, 895 F.2d at 1372-73 (disagreeing that due process requires proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt, and approving of other cases upholding use of preponderance 
standard). 
152. See Guerrero, 863 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1988). 
153. See Smith, 887 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1989). 
154. See Frederick, 897 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1990). 
155. See Guerrero, 863 F.2d at 250 ("[W)e agree with the Commission that its 
change in the commentary ... only clarif[ies) a meaning that was fairly to be drawn from 
the original version."); Smith, 887 F.2d at 106-08 (amendment to section lB1.3 was a 
mere clarification of original version); Frederick, 897 F.2d at 494 (changes were a 
"permissable clarification ... "). 
156. See United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204 (11th Cir. 1989). "We note that 
as applied to the facts of this case, there is no substantive difference between the Octo-
ber 1987 and January 1988 versions of guideline 181.3." [d. at 1211, n.19. 
157. See Taplette, 872 F.2d at 106. See also supra note 139. 
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Commission clearly intended that quantities of drugs calculated 
on the basis of conduct of which the defendant was neither 
charged nor convicted may be considered in determining the 
base offense level if that conduct was part of the same course of 
conduct or common scheme as the conviction offense. 1I18 The ma-
jority reasoned that such a determination reflects the Sentencing 
Commission's compromise between "real offense" sentencing 
and "charge offense" sentencing. lli9 It also noted that their deci-
sion is consistent with the pre-Guidelines practice of sentencing 
judges, who regularly considered conduct of which the defendant 
was not convicted. ISO 
The majority held that the quantities of drugs were prop-
erly aggregated under the Relevant Conduct section of the 
Guidelines/sl noting that commentary to the Relevant Conduct 
section specifically states "convictions are not required."ls2 The 
court reasoned that to rule otherwise would be to ignore the 
commentary, which could lead to an incorrect application of the 
Guidelines, and subject the sentence to possible reversal on 
appea1. 1S3 
158. United States v. Restrepo, 903 F.2d at 653. 
159. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 653. See also supra notes 74-81 and accompanying 
text; and see generally Breyer supra, note 74, at 8-12. 
160. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 653. See also United States v. Blanco 888 F.2d 907 (1st 
Cir. 1989). The court in Blanco found that an analysis of pre-Guidelines sentencing re-
vealed that with respect to drug and money crimes, the actual time the offender served 
reflected the amount of money or drugs actually involved, not simply the amount shown 
in the indictment, and concluding that to this extent, pre-Guideline sentencing repre-
sented "real" offense sentencing. Blanco 903 F.2d at 909-10. See also United States v. 
White, 888 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1989). "Before the Guidelines, judges routinely took into 
account other bad acts of which the defendant had not been convicted. The use they 
made of this information was all but unreviewable on appeal." White, 888 F.2d at 498; 
and see United States v. Smith 887 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1989) in which the Sixth Circuit 
discussed pre-Guideline practice. "[B)efore making [the sentencing) determination, a 
judge may conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of 
information he may consider, or the source from which it came."). Smith, 887 F.2d at 
108, n.5 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446). 
161. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d 652. See also supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text. 
162. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 652. See also Guidelines § 1B1.3 (Application Note 2 
at 1.19). In addition, the commentary provides that in drug distribution cases, quantities 
of drugs not specified in the count of conviction are to be included in determining the 
offense level if they were part of the same course of conduct as the count of conviction. 
Guidelines at 1.20 (Background notes). 
163. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 652. "The Commentary that accompanies the guide-
line sections may serve a numnber of purposes. First, it may interpret the guideline or 
explain how it is to be applied. Failure to follow such commentary could constitute an 
incorrect application of the Guideline, subjecting the sentence to possible reversal on 
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2. The Standard of Proof and Due Process 
The majority held that when using the preponderance stan-
dard at a sentencing hearing to increase the period of confine-
ment, the evidence must be of sufficient weight to "convince a 
reasonable person of the probable existence of the enhancing 
factor."164 The court noted that in so holding, its decision was 
supported by the Guidelines,16r> which provide that at sentenc-
ing, the court may consider relevant information "provided that 
the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to support its 
probable accuracy."166 
The majority cited the Supreme Court's holding in McMil-
lan v. Pennsylvania to find that a preponderance standard satis-
fies due process for post-conviction determinations,167 and that 
the sentencing court's lack of discretion does not require a 
higher standard of proof.168 The majority also noted that a re-
cent Ninth Circuit opinion held that the Constitution requires 
district courts to make factual determinations at sentencing only 
by a preponderance of the evidence,169 and other circuits 
agree.170 
While observing that the preponderance standard is widely 
appeal. Second, the commentary may suggest circumstances which, in view of the Com-
mission, may warrant departure from the guidelines. Such commentary is to be treated 
as the legal equiualent of a policy statement." [d. (quoting Guidelines § 18l.7 (Signifi-
cance of Commentary) (emphasis in original). 
164. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 654-55. The majority observed that because the issue 
was not presented, they would not define the preponderance of the evidence standard as 
applied in sentencing when the defendant had the burden of proof, i.e. when used to 
prove mitigating factors. [d. at 655, n.6. 
165. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 655. 
166. [d. (quoting Guidelines § 6Al.3(a». The court further noted that while section 
6Al.3(a) does not specify the quantity of evidence required, it does require that the qual-
ity of evidence be such that the information is "probably accurate .... " Restrepo II 903 
F.2d at 655 (emphasis in original). 
167. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 654 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 
(1986». See also supra note 37. 
168. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 654 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 92). 
169. See United States v. Wilson, 900 F.2d 1350 (1990). "We hold ... that District 
Courts are constitutionally required to make factual determinations underlying applica-
tion of the Guidelines by at least a preponderance of the evidence." [d. at 1354. 
170. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 654. See also supra notes 143-51 and accompanying 
text. 
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accepted for proving factors used to enhance sentences,171 the 
majority noted that when used for that purpose, the standard 
has not been specifically defined.172 The majority rejected a lit-
eral interpretation of the standard, which would call for no more 
than a weighing of the evidence, a preponderance being only a 
slight tip of the scales.173 According to the majority, the severe 
consequences of sentence enhancement necessitated a more de-
manding interpretation of the preponderance standard.174 
3. Ex Post Facto 
The majority held the application of the amended Guide-
lines did not disadvantage Restrepo because substantial per-
sonal rights were not altered, m thus no ex post facto violation 
occurred.176 Accordingly, a criminal law is ex post facto if it ap-
plies retrospectively to events occurring before its enactment,!" 
and it disadvantages the defendant affected by it.178 
The majority cited to the Relevant Conduct section's com-
mentary which provides that the section's amendments "clarify 
the intent underlying ... [the section] as originally promul-
gated."179 The majority noted that if it deferred to the Commis-
sion's interpretation that the amendments are merely clarifica-
tions and not substantive changes, then their retrospective 
application presented no ex post facto issue.18o The majority 
noted, however, that the Relevant Conduct section would have 
dictated an identical result before the amendments;181 the 1988 
171. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 654. See also supra notes 143-51. 
172. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 654. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (quantum of proof required 
increases with relative importance of ultimate decision». 
175. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 655 (citing Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987». The 
court in Restrepo II noted the law must alter" 'substantial personal rights', not merely 
change 'modes of procedure which do not affect matters of substance.' " Restrepo II, 903 
F.2d at 655 (quoting Miller, 482 U.S. at 430). 
176. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 656. 
177. Id. at 655 (citing Miller, 482 U.S. at 430). 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 656 (quoting Guidelines Commentary at 1.21). 
180. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 656. The majority cited several cases that have dis-
posed of the issue on these grounds. See supra notes 152-55 and accompanying text. 
181. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 656. See also Guidelines § IB1.3 (Oct. 1987). 
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amendments merely made this more explicit.182 
B. DISSENT 
Judge Pregerson, dissenting, argued that the Guidelines are 
ambiguous because the Multiple Counts section requires convic-
tions but the Relevant Conduct section does not.183 He conceded 
that under pre-Guideline practice, judges did have wide discre-
tion,184 but under the Guidelines that discretion is very lim-
ited;1811 the existence of certain factors demand mandatory in-
creases in the sentence. 186 He concluded that the majority 
wrongly contended that its approach was consistent with pre-
Guideline sentencing practice. 187 
In addition, he observed that under the majority's interpre-
tation, the government could charge and prosecute only those 
counts that are easily provable. 188 The prosecution would still be 
able to punish for all related criminal conduct in more serious 
offenses proved only by a preponderance of the evidence.189 
Moreover, the Government could reach plea agreements on mi-
nor charges in exchange for dropping all other counts, then use 
the conduct underlying the dropped counts to dramatically in-
crease the defendant's sentence.190 According to Judge Preger-
son, very serious consequences will result from the majority's ap-
proach, thus, at the very least, a clear and convincing standard 
should be adopted for factual findings at sentencing hearings.19l 
182. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 656. See also Guidelines § 181.3 (1988) (Application 
Note 2). 
183. United States v. Restrepo, 903 F.2d 648, 657 (1990) (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
See also Restrepo [, 883 F.2d at 786. 
184. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 657. 
185. [d. 
186. [d. 
187. [d. Judge Pregersen noted that trial judges have long taken into account re-
lated conduct in determining sentences, but under the Guidelines, they must apply fac-
tors with fixed weights applicable to all cases without allowing for adjustments to reflect 
differing degrees of certainty. 
188. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 658. 
189. [d. 
190. [d. See also infra note 206. 
191. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 658. 
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V. CRITIQUE 
Regardless of the controversies surrounding the Guidelines, 
the Supreme Court192 and the Ninth Circuit19S have declared 
them constitutionap94 It remains to be seen, however, whether 
the Guidelines will withstand a due process challenge in the Su-
preme Court. 1911 Rather than challenging the Guidelines on 
broad constitutional grounds, defendants in the Ninth Circuit 
will be limited to applied due process challenges,196 and chal-
lenges to the court's application of the Guidelines.197 
It is clear that the Ninth Circuit's analysis and interpreta-
tion of the Guidelines in Restrepo II is correct. The court's in-
terpretation of the Guidelines in Restrepo 1 was directly criti-
cized by other circuits,196 and clearly contradicted the majority 
of other circuit decisions.199 Moreover, when the commentary to 
the Guidelines is considered,20o it is difficult to find logic in the 
analysis of Restrepo 1.201 The commentary singles out drug dis-
tribution cases, and states that quantities of drugs not specified 
in conviction counts may be used in determining the base of-
fense level if the additional drugs are part of the same course of 
conduct as the conviction counts.202 
192. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). See also supra notes 87-
102 and accompanying text. 
193. See United States v. Brady, 895 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 1990). See also supra, notes 
103-16 and accompanying text. 
194. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 412, Brady 895 F.2d at 539. 
195. See Brady, 895 F.2d at 539. 
196. Id. at 543. See also supra notes 117-19. 
197. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d) (1988). See also supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
198. See e.g., United States v. Blanco, 888 F.2d 907 (1st Cir. 1989) The First Circuit 
observed that while most circuits read the Guidelines as they did, the Ninth Circuit did 
not. The court went on to directly criticize the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in 
Restrepo I. The First Circuit observed that in Restrepo I, the Ninth Circuit apparently 
believed that the Multiple Counts section made consideration of the added drugs inap-
propriate. The First Circuit went on to note that it is "the relevant conduct rules, how-
ever, not the multiple count rules" that made consideration of the added drugs relevant 
to sentencing. Blanco, 888 F.2d at 910. Accord United States v. White, 888 F.2d 490 (7th 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Vopravil, 891 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Ger-
ante, 891 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v. Alston, 895 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 
1990); United States v. Rutter 897 F.2d 1558 (10th Cir. 1990). 
199. See supra, note 199. See also supra notes 131-42. 
200. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text. 
201. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text. 
202. See Guidelines Commentary to § 1B1.3 at 1.20. "[lIn drug distribution cases, 
quantities and types of drugs not specified in the count of conviction are to be included 
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While Judge Pregerson's interpretation of the Guidelines in 
his dissenting opinion in Restrepo II rests on faulty reasoning,203 
his fear of the detrimental affect the majority's holding may 
have on plea bargaining204 deserves serious consideration. 20~ 
Judge Pregerson observed that under the majority's holding, the 
government could reach plea agreements with defendants on mi-
nor charges, then use the conduct underlying the dropped 
counts to increase the defendant's sentence.206 Indeed, several 
circuits have lent credibility to Judge Pregerson's concerns by 
holding that conduct in counts dropped pursuant to plea agree-
ments could still be considered at sentencing.207 While the Com-
mission intended that the current status of plea bargaining re-
main unchanged,208 at least one commentator has suggested 
in determining the offense level if they were part of the same course of conduct or part of 
a common scheme or plan as the count of conviction." 
203. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text, see also supra note 198. 
204. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 658, see also supra notes 188-90 and accompanying 
text. 
205. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 656-57. In his concurring opinion, Judge Noonan wrote 
separately to state that while he concurred in the majority's opinion, he wished to note 
that "Pregerson's misgivings deserve serious consideration." Id. at 656. 
206. Restrepo II, 903 F.2d at 658. 
207. See e.g., United States v. Scroggins, 880 F.2d 1204 (11th Cir. 1989). The Elev-
enth Circuit held that the Government's agreement to drop certain theft charges in ex-
change for a guilty plea did not preclude the district court from considering evidence of 
dropped charges at the sentencing hearing. Id. at 1214. Also, in United States v. 
Taplette, 872 F.2d 101 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 110 S. Ct. 128 (1989), the Fifth Circuit 
held that three drug sales that were dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement and that 
were part of the same course of conduct as the count to w/lich the defendant pled guilty, 
could be considered as a basis for upward departure. Taplette, 872 F.2d at 106-07. Fur-
ther, in United States v. Fox, 889 F.2d 357 (lst. Cir. 1989), the First Circuit held that a 
bank officer's plea agreement to one fraudulent loan charge, in which the Government 
agreed not to prosecute for other defalcations, was not breached by the Government 
when information about other fraudulent loans was provided to the probation office ei-
ther by the Government or the bank and used to determine defendant's base offense 
level. The ultimate result was that the defendant received the exact same sentence he 
would have received had the Government prosecuted him, and the court convicted him, 
of all incidents of defalcation which occurred while defendant worked at the bank. Fox, 
899 F.2d at 362-63. 
208. See Guidelines § 6B, introductory comments at 6.5. "[B]ecause of the difficulty 
in anticipating problems in this area, and because the sentencing guidelines are to some 
degree experimental, substantive restrictions on judicial discretion [regarding plea agree-
ments] would be premature at this stage of the Commission's work." Id. See also Panel 
V: Equality Versus Discretion in Sentencing, 26 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 1813 (1989). In a 
panel discussion with Ilene H. Nagel, a member of the Sentencing Commission, and Ter-
ence MacCarthy, Chairman of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section, 
Judge Breyer, another member of the Commission, discussed policy decisions in respect 
to plea bargaining. He observed that half of the people believed that plea bargaining was 
"the most terrible thing they had ever heard of," while the other half believed that 
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there may be a shift from "charge" bargaining to "sentence" 
bargaining.209 
In cases of drug trafficking, the sentences ultimately arrived 
at under the Guidelines will usually be a "real offense" sen-
tence.210 Since such sentencing is based on the total amount of 
drugs seized rather than only the amount involved in the charge, 
a defendant has less incentive to enter into a "charge" bargain2l1 
whereby the defendant pleads guilty in exchange for the prose-
cutor's promise to drop more serious charges.212 More desirable 
to a defendant in a drug distribution case would be a "sentence" 
bargain, whereby the defendant pleads guilty in exchange for 
the prosecutor's promise to recommend a specific, agreed upon 
sentence.213 Because judges will sometimes find it necessary to 
depart from the Guidelines to effectuate a plea bargain,214 it is 
significant that the Commission has been careful not to take 
away judicial discretion in the plea bargaining context. m As a 
result, under the Guidelines, charge bargaining may no longer 
eighty-five percent of the system runs on it. In the end, he stated, the Commission said 
"We are not going to change the [plea bargaining) system at the present time." Id. at 
1838. 
209. See Breyer and Feinberg, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Dialogue, 26 
CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1990). After noting that in a thousand count indictment, if the client 
pleads guilty to one, he will still be sentenced on the basis of all thousand, Breyer sug-
gests bargaining for a lower sentence under FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(e)(l)(B) instead of charge 
bargaining under Rule l1(e)(l)(a). Specifically he stated, "I would expect to see the pat-
tern of plea bargaining changing from charge to sentence bargaining." Id. at 30. 
210. See United States v. Fernandez, 877 F.2d 1138, 1142 (2d Cir. 1989). See also 
supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
211. See FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(e)(l)(A) which reads in pertinent part: 
(1) In General. The attorney for the government and the at-
torney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se 
may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an 
agreement that, upon entering of a plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere to a charged offense or to a lesser related offense, the 
attorney for the government will do any of the following: 
(A) move for dismissal of the other charges .... 
212. Fernandez, 877 F.2d at 1144. 
213. See FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(e)(l)(B) which reads in pertinent part: "(B) make a 
recommendation or agree not to oppose the defendant's request for a particular sentence 
with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall not be binding upon 
the court .... " 
214. Departure would be necessary to effectuate a plea bargain wherein the sentence 
agreed upon pursuant to the bargain was lower than the applicable sentence range pre-
scribed by the Guidelines. 
215. See Fernandez, 877 F.2d at 1145. "Significantly, the Commission has been 
careful not to foreclose broad judicial discretion in plea bargaining situations. See also 
supra note 208. 
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prove valuable to defendants in drug cases.216 
It is clear that the benefit of plea bargaining will be under-
mined if defendants do not receive the benefits that they reason-
ably expected from the agreement.217 The solution to Judge 
Pregerson's concerns lies not in adopting a clear and convincing 
standard as suggested, but in ensuring that defendants are fully 
apprised of the consequences of entering into a plea agree-
ment.218 Neither the court nor the prosecutor has an obligation 
to fully advise the defendant of all ramifications of sentencing 
under the Guidelines,219 so that duty must be with the defense 
attorney. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The future status of the Guidelines is uncertain. The Fed-
eral Courts Committee has recommended that Congress consider 
changing them from compulsory rules to general standards that 
identify merely a presumptive sentence.220 One commentator has 
suggested that it may be five to ten years before we know if the 
216. Fernandez, 877 F.2d at 1145. 
217. See United States v. Ykema, 887 F.2d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1989). 
218. Ykema, 887 F.2d at 699. The court stated that federal courts should be "espe-
cially careful" in advising defendants of the ramifications of sentencing under the Guide-
lines, and that prosecutors should avoid any behavior that may be constituted as trick-
ery. The court noted that in time, plea bargaining under the Guidelines will become 
more commonplace, but until then, defendants should have the opportunity to fully un-
derstand how their plea agreements will be given effect. I d. 
219. See Fernandez, 877 F.2d at 1143. The court held that the fact that the govern-
ment's attorney did not explain the applicable Guidelines sentence range to defendant 
violated no duty the government owed to him. The court further held that under FED. R. 
CRIM. P. l1(c)(l), the court must apprise defendant of the range of punishment to which 
he may be sentenced, but this imposes upon the courts only a duty to inform defendant 
of the maximum and minimum sentences provided by law. [d. The court did note, how-
ever, that in some circumstances, the applicable Guideline sentence will be easily ascer-
tainable, and in those situations, the district court has "full discretion to - and where 
feasible, should - explain the likely Guideline sentence to the defendant before ac-
cepting the plea." Id. at 1144. 
220. See Report of The Federal Court Study Committee, April 2, 1990, reprinted in 
relevant part, 2 FED. SENT. R. 232-37 (1990). This suggestion of the Committee was pub-
licly attacked by Judge Wilkins, chairman of the Sentencing Commission. Wilkins sug-
gested that such an approach would result in a return to the irrational sentencing dispar-
ities that the Guidelines were supposed to correct. Wilkins' comments are reported in 
NAT'L L,J., Proposals on Courts Debated: Some Reforms Threaten to Re-ignite 
Firestorms, Feb. 12, 1990, pg. 1. 
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Guidelines are adequately serving their purpose.221 One thing is 
certain: the Guidelines will remain subject to review and revi-
sion by the Commission.222 Regardless of the future of the 
Guidelines, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Restrepo II presents 
a clear move toward uniformity among the circuits in interpret-
ing the Relevant Conduct Section of the Guidelines. 
Matthew A. Goodin* 
221. See PaneL V: EquaLity Versus Discretion in Sentencing, 26 AMER. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1813 (1989) Judge Breyer states that the new law "brings about one of the most 
significant changes in the criminal law in this century .... Is the game worth the can-
dle? ... We can begin to answer five or ten years from now." Id. at 1830. 
222. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(0), providing that the Commission shall periodically review 
and revise the Guidelines in consideration of data and comments coming to its attention. 
The section also provides that authorities on, individuals and institutional representan-
tives of, various aspects of the Federal criminal justice system may submit observation, 
comments or questions to the Commission regarding the Guidelines. These representan-
tives must at least anually, submit written reports to the Commission suggesting 
changes, and otherwise assessing the Commission's work. See aLso 28 U.S.c. § 994(p), 
giving Commission authority to amend and modify the GuideLines. 
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1992. 
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